Illegal trade 51 52
Smuggling is the illegal trading of goods across borders (Joossens & Raw, 53 Illegal cross-border trade has been associated with milk products ( Rimalo, 2016) and human organs and people (Adhikari, 2016; Salt, 2000) . 84
Translating definitions with regard to human smuggling and trafficking, food 85 smuggling can be described as when all parties involved, excluding regulatory and 86 enforcement agencies, are fully consenting to illicit behaviour whereas food trafficking 87 involves coercion towards one or more parties, however, the fine line between 88 smuggling and trafficking is sometimes unclear (Butterly, 2014) . Díaz (2015) 89 differentiates between small, petty smuggling (for personal use) and professional 90 smuggling or trafficking for profit where a significant volume of goods is transported 91 through international shipping channels (Ferrier, 2009 ). In order to protect national 92 farmers, some food products are subject to additional import tariffs. These products 93 may be more at risk of smuggling as a means to avoid taxation or import tariffs (Lotta 94 & Bogue, 2015) . This highlights the economic driver for individuals and organisations 95 to engage in such practice. Joossens and Raw (2012) 
differentiate between tax 96
avoidance, legal and legitimate activities, and alternatively tax evasion, illegal 97 activities, undertaken to pay less or no tax. Factors that can lead to "black" economic activity include high taxes or complex tax 129 systems, low tax morale, low Gross Domestic Product, weak institutions and corruption 130 (Snowden, 2012). Differences in reported smuggling prevalence rates between 131 countries is attributed to the types of goods affected by any trade prohibitions, the 132 degree of opacity of smuggled goods and the ease of bringing incorrectly identified 133 materials on manifest documents, and the targeting of any enforcement resources 134 including purposive sampling (Ferrier, 2009) . 135
Fresh garlic imports to the EU are subjected to ad valorem duty. As production 136 costs in China are lower, the illegal import of Chinese fresh garlic is attractive to 137 smugglers. OLAF (2010) highlight a smuggling operating route via Norway where 138 garlic is exempted from customs duties and only value added tax (VAT) needs to be 139 paid, so after customs clearance the Chinese garlic could be transferred to the EU 140 instead of placing it on the market in Norway and thus bypassing such duty being paid. 141
Also due to the intra-community trade within the EU this product could then be 142 transferred to any country often without further inspection. One in ten bottles or cans 143 of beer sold in the United Kingdom (UK) had not had duty paid on them with 144 counterfeit alcohol sold by both licit and illicit retailers (Snowden, 2012) . It is estimated 145 that 35% of overall agricultural produce of the West Bank marketed in Israel was 146 smuggled (Ihle & Rubin, 2013) and the 2013 United States (US) honey smuggling 147 incident resulted in the non-payment of US$40 million in taxes (Spink et al., 2016) . 148
Estimates consider the reach of the illicit IUU fishing economy encompasses between 149 13% and 31% of reported catches, and over half in some regions with an associated 150 value of between $10 and $23.5 billion per year (Pramod et al., 2014 ; Agnew et al., 151
2009). 152
Market and regulatory standards and the wider regulatory environment play a 153 fundamental role in the transnational supply chain (Knoll et al., 2017) . Indeed, the 154 rationale for whether a specific country is given an export licence for a second country, 155 or trading group, is largely based on consideration of existing national standards, and 156 the degree of adoption within the given internal supply chain of standards that address 157 legality, food safety, quality and the control of animal disease. Brazil, as an example, this in itself is a driver for an illicit, underground economy as demand still remains the 166 same in specific countries for certain types of foods, but that demand cannot be met 167 through legal supply routes. Further, as it is outside the traditional multiple retailer 168 dominated supply chains that have higher embedded private standards that supplier 169 organisations are mandated to comply with for market access, any resultant illicit trade 170 has reduced oversight. Naim (2005) concludes that illicit trade is driven not from a 171 moral standpoint, instead it is motivated by the opportunity to make high profits. for disseminating MRSA into the EU and it is difficult to estimate the amount of food 183 from non-EU countries entering the EU black market where food products can come 184 from the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria and Russia, but this is definitely a 185 cause for concern (Oniciuc et al., 2015) . It is also a challenge as the EU has many 186 seaports, airports, and routes of entry. In addition to the standard entry and transit ports 187 and food trade incidents were logged within the RASFF database. In this timeframe 248 notifications for illegal trade were highest for meat products (n=62) followed by fruits 249 and vegetables (n=58), other food products (n=39), fish and fish products (n=35) and 250 poultry and poultry products (n=29) see Figure 1 and Table 1 . Misrepresentative 251 manifest documents are sometimes difficult to identify when food is packed into large 252 containers and labelled in a foreign language and it may be impractical to check every 253 element of the consignment (Ferrier, 2009). The enforcement authorities at ports will 254 notify RASFF of any rejection related to a direct or indirect risk to human health. 255
Destruction was by and large the most common action undertaken for illicit fruits, 256 vegetables, fishery, poultry and other food categories possibly as the consignments 257 were deemed to be a risk to human or animal health or because persons responsible for 258 the consignment failed to comply with the direction to re-export (Pocknell, Tanner Informal food networks, behave in the same way as criminal networks and are 296 characterised by their heterogenicity i.e. their diversity in composition, density of 297 connections, size, structure, shape, underlying bonding mechanisms, degree of 298 sophistication, and scope of activities (Williams, 2011) . Further, the capacity for food 299 trafficking networks to cross national borders creates an advantage for perpetrators 300 because it enables them to supply markets where the profit margins are largest, whilst 301 operating from and in countries where risks are the least (Manning et al., 2016) . 302
Illegality as an attribute of a food is therefore transient i.e. once an illegally imported 303 material has been re-packaged, or incorporated into a food product the inherent illicit 304 nature of the first state has subsequently been masked. Further illicitness is not an 305
Manning, 2017). 313
Whether at a multi-member trading block level, setting national priorities to 314 combat smuggling or at a discrete supply chain or business level, the undertaking of 315 food fraud vulnerability risk assessments to determine the potential for such activity in 316 the food supply chain is an evolving art. At present the process is largely qualitative or 317 semi-quantitative (Manning et al., 2016 ) and built on a number of assumptions that, due 318 to the cost involved, are not fully tested or explored. This means that new predictive 319 methods need to be developed to address food smuggling and trafficking in order to 320 protect the food economy and most specifically prevent harm to the consumer, both in 321 terms of the financial, environmental, social and health impacts. Whilst there is a gap 322 in the literature with regard to food smuggling, one associated consumer item where 323 anti-trafficking and smuggling protocols are in place is tobacco. These controls are now 324 considered in order to translate such protocols to the scenario of controlling illicit food 325 smuggling and trafficking. 326
Lessons from tobacco smuggling: context and controls 327
Tobacco is one of the most commonly smuggled commodities in the world 328 infrastructure that aid distribution of illegal tobacco including data opacity, strength of 350 policy frameworks and measures and tolerance of illicit behaviour (Table 2) . 351
Take in Table 2 352
Weak policy measures that influence the incidence of commodity smuggling and 354 trafficking include: inadequate legislation and sanctions, the weak enforcement of 355 regulatory controls; the lack of robust official controls in free trade zones and on goods 356 in transit; the lack of coordination of government agencies and weak goal alignment; 357 having protectionist policy measures such as tariffs that create incentives to deceive; 358 the disparities in tax driven prices between jurisdictions; unbalanced fiscal policy with 359 high tax burden including value added tax (VAT) on the products that are at risk of 360 being smuggled; weak information exchange systems at national and international 361 level; and no, or if present, poorly functioning public awareness campaigns. Table 3 ). The policy elements 372 determined here to address tobacco would also form an effective strategy towards illicit 373 food trade. 374 Table 3 These could include 1D, 2D or 3D barcoding and radio-frequency identification (RFID) 398
Take in

systems. 399
Supply chain strategies to address illicit tobacco trade operate at three levels 400 influencing and reducing the supply of raw materials to illegal operations, reducing 401 illicit manufacturing capacity and putting pressure on illegal distribution networks from 402 growing through to sales of finished product (Interpol, 2014 
Conclusion 412
The capacity for illicit food networks to cross national borders often avoiding tariffs 413 or regulatory control creates an economic advantage for those actors involved. Illicit 414 food trade, described in this paper as smuggling, enables perpetrators to supply value-415 added markets where the profit margins are largest, whilst operating from and often in 416 countries where risks of discovery of their activity are the least. The scope of this dark 417 food trade is largely unquantified by current research activity. The challenge for 418 addressing food smuggling is that illegality can be transient i.e. once an illegally 419 imported material has been re-packaged, or incorporated into a composite food product 420 its illicit nature can be masked. 421
The literature and data explored in this conceptual paper outlines firstly that the 422 prevalence of illegal food trade makes this a subject worthy of note and in need of 423 further empirical research. It is important not to consider illegal food trade as being 424 totally distinct from legal trade. It should be recognised that illegal activity, including 425 smuggling or trafficking rather than being a parallel food chain is actually embedded 426 
Factors of influence
Financial
• Customers seeking to save money.
• Smokers wanting cheaper products.
• Affordability for those on low incomes or in an economic downturn.
• Criminals seeking to make money including taking advantage of tax differentials.
• Opportunity to launder money.
• Legitimate businesses turning a blind eye to increase profit.
Logistics and data management infrastructure
• Tobacco manufacturers seeking to penetrate new markets.
• Growth in illegal distribution and criminal networks.
• New transit routes and infrastructure being developed in countries with weak regulatory control.
• Oversupply of tobacco products in source country.
• Poor quality data in terms of records and import/export declarations, inadequate data handing capacity and unreliable information technology infrastructure.
• Ease and cost of smuggling as tobacco is light and portable.
Policy framework
• Inadequate legislation and sanctions especially with regard to intellectual property.
• Weak enforcement of controls, lack of enforcement capacity, poorly trained police forces and inspection officials and lack of political will to fight illicit trade in source countries leading to low prosecution rates and weak penalties for offenders.
• Weak official border controls.
• Lack of robust official controls in free trade zones and on goods in transit.
• Lack of cooperation and coordination of government agencies and weak goal alignment • Protectionist policy measures such as tariffs.
• Disparities in tax driven prices between jurisdictions.
• An unbalanced fiscal policy with a high tax burden on tobacco products.
• Weak information exchange systems at national and international level.
• Poorly functioning or lacking public awareness campaigns.
Tolerance of illicit behaviour
• Level of corruption (e.g. as measured by the Transparency Index).
• Corruption and bribery of public officials.
• Public tolerance of the illicit trade in tobacco products.
Knowledge
• Consumer inability to recognise illegal product. 756 757 • Understand and monitor the size and nature of the problem e.g. through an unexplained drop in legal market sales as identified by the industry or associated tax revenue, increased incidence of illegal product seizures (frequency of incidents or volume of product); emergence of new brands as is also seen with illicit trade in alcohol.
• Adopt a balanced tax policy and operate effective tax collection and means to recover tax revenue losses and destruction costs e.g. asset confiscation.
• Analyze existing legislation and regulations to ensure they work and are enforced effectively and that offences are clearly identified, the penalties for contravention are adequate and act as a deterrent; systematic destruction of illicit products and illicit supply chain infrastructureand effective tracking and tracing mechanisms.
• Conduct full impact assessments of any proposed tobacco related legislation.
• Ensure the judiciary is aware of the seriousness of the crime and the need to destroy illicit product and equipment in a timely manner.
• Evaluate the main facilitators, including manufacturing and export controls, Free Zones and transit operations, etc.
• Develop an enforcement strategy that includes all relevant national agencies and ensure they possess adequate powers to act effectively.
• Provide sufficient financial resources for adequate law enforcement capacity.
• Tackle demand by educating and informing the public about the implications of the illicit trade.
• Build and strengthen partnerships between national and international agencies.
• Cooperate with legitimate industry players to make the best use of combined intelligence and resources.
• Implement anti-money laundering provisions and transparent payment procedures.
• Implement a track and trace programme for products. 
